or bourgeois socialism of a Francois Perroux or an Henri de Mannot to mention such contemporary advocates as Bernard Crick, W. H. Ferry, Pierre Mendes-France and David Apter.
All of these-and the list is by no means complete nor are the above groupings by any means sharply distinctive4-have converged upon the advocacy of an institutional relationship between the systems of authoritative decision-making and interest representation which can be considered as generically corporatist by my praxiological definition (and frequently defined as such by the authors themselves), although they conceived of this arrangement as involving radically different structures of power and influence, as benefiting quite distinct social classes, and as promoting diametrically opposite public policies.
A French student of corporatism described the situation quite well when he said:
The army of corporatists is so disparate that one is led to think that the word, corporation, itself is like a label placed on a whole batch of bottles which are then distributed among diverse producers each of whom fills them with the drink of his choice. The consumer has to look carefully.5
The situation is even further confused by the fact that many contemporary theorists, ideologues and activists are peddling the same drink under yet other labels.
Not only is corporatism defined as an ideology (or worse as a weltanschauung) difficult to pin down to a central set of values or beliefs and even more difficult to associate with the aspirations or interests of a specific social group, but virtually all detailed empirical inquiries of corporatist praxis have shown its performance and behavior to be at considerable variance-if not diametrically opposed-to the beliefs manifestly advanced by its verbal defenders. As another French scholar of the forties (himself an advocate of corporatism a sa maniere) observed, "The reality of existing corporatisms is, without a doubt, infinitely less seductive than the doctrine."6 Contemporary conceptualizations of corporatism based 4 To this article I have appendixed a working bibliography of some 100 titles which seem important to an understanding of the ideological and praxiological bases of corporatism up to and including the interwar period. In short, I find there is simply too much normative variety and behavioral hypocrisy in the use of the corporatist ideological label to make it a useful operational instrument for comparative analysis.
Nor do I find it very productive to consider corporatism to be an exclusive part or a distinctive product of a particular political culture, especially one linked to some geographically circumscribed area such as the Iberian Peninsula7 or the Mediterranean.8 This approach to corporatism not only runs up against the usual (and in my view, well-founded) criticisms raised against most, if not all, political-cultural "explanations"9-especially against those based on impressionistic evidence and circular reasoning0?-but also fails 10 Such reasoning has been particularly prevalent among Anglo-Saxon students of Latin America where, from the start, these area specialists seem to have drawn the following syllogism: "Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans; Latin America was colonized by Spain and Portugal; North America by Great Britain; Latin Americans are Catholics, North Americans are predominantly Protestant; ergo, Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans because of their Catholic-Iberian heritage!"
The few systematically comparative studies of attitudes which have included both Latin and North American samples have generally concluded that once one controls for education, class, center-periphery residence, age, etc., residual differences that could be assigned specifically to culture are statistically completely to explain why similar configurations and behavior in interest politics have emerged and persist in a great variety of cultural settings, stretching from Northern Europe, across the Mediterranean to such exotic places as Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia and Taiwan, to name but a few. This form of pseudoexplanation also cannot contribute much to answering the question of why, even within the presumed homeland of such an ethos, that is, the Iberian Peninsula and its "fragments," corporatism has waxed and waned during different historical periods. Are we to believe that political culture is a sort of "spigot variable" which gets turned on every once in a while to produce a different system of functional representation? Also we might ask, why do societies supposedly sharing the same general ethos exhibit such wide diversity in interest-group values, practices and consequences? By all empirically available standards, Spain is more Catholic than Portugal, Colombia more so than Brazil, yet in each case it is the latter which has by far the more corporatist system. At best, then, culturalist arguments must be heavily supplemented to account for such embarrassing deviations in outcome.
Finally, since those who have advanced such an explanation also tend to place a great deal of emphasis on ideology (occasionally even accepting word for fact), we might wonder why the major ideologues of corporatism have not come from this part of the world. A quick glance at the admittedly incomplete bibliography attached to this essay will show that the intellectual origins of corporatism are predominately German, Belgian, French and Austrian and, secondarily and belatedly, English, Italian and Rumanian. Those who advocated corporatism in the Iberian and Latin American areas unabashedly and unashamedly imported their ideas from abroad. Moder, nonmedieval, corporatism was diffused to the Iberian-Mediterranean area, not created within it.ll insignificant. See especially Joseph Kahl, The Measurement of Modernity (Austin, Texas, 1968).
11 It is also worth mentioning that many, if not most, of the theorists of modern corporatism have not been Catholics. Many were in fact militantly secular. Even those who most publicly claimed to be inspired by "Social Christian" ideals, such as Salazar and Dollfuss, followed a much more bureaucratic, statist and authoritarian praxis. Also worth stressing is that among "Social Christians" or more broadly, progressive Catholics, not all by any means advocated corporatism. Such prominent figures as Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier opposed it. See Henri Guitton, Le Catholicisme Social (Paris, 1945) .
Also worth mentioning is that corporatism has been considered quite Another tendency which has cropped up in recent discussions of corporatism is to define or, better, submerge it into some wider political configuration such as "the organic state" or "the authoritarian regime."12 The "organic state" concept runs up against many of the criticisms of definitional vagueness, lack of potential empirical specificity and circularity of argument leveled above at the political cultural approach. More importantly, it fails to take into account the historical fact that many "organically conceived" states were not composed of corporatist subunits, but built upon a great variety of "organs" ranging from the curies and phratries of Fustel de Coulange's ancient city,13 to the "metallic" orders of moral excellence in Plato's ideal polity,14 to the three to five estate systems of various anciens regimes,15 to the phalanges of Fourier,16 to the rigions of Robert LaFont,17 even to the autonomous, plural communities of Percival and Paul Goodman or Gar Alperovitz.18 If one accepts that a special characteristic of modem corporatism (this in both ideology and practice) concerns the role of functional interest associations, then it is but one of many possible structural units, for example, familial, territorial-communitarian, moral, religious, "productionist," etc., which may go into the establishment of an "organic state." Emphasizing that macrocharacteristic does little to specify concrete relations of authority, influence and representation, except to differentiate them from equally vague notions of the "mechanical state." The relation of corporatism in interest politics to a specific global type of political regime is a much more complicated (and, in my view, interesting) issue. For reasons which will, I hope, become apparent in the course of this essay I have found it more useful to define it as a concrete, observable general system of interest representation which is "compatible" with several different regime-types, i.e., with different party systems, varieties of ruling ideology, levels of political mobilization, varying scopes of public policy, etc. Then I will endeavor to specify distinct subtypes of corporatist representation which seem to have at least an elective affinity for, if not to be essential defining elements of, specific regime-types during specific periods of their development.19
Yet another tendency in the revived discussion of corporatism which differs from that proposed here is that which submerges the concept, not in some wider concept of regional political culture, state form or regime-type, but in some marcosocietal characteristic such as the presence of visual stigmata,20 or the existence of religiously, ideologically or linguistically determined zuilen lager, or families spirituelles.21 Here the problem is simply that stigmatized or pillared societies exhibit quite different degrees of corporatism in the sense used herein and that, vice versa, many heavily corporatized systems of interest representation exist in societies which have no marked visual stigmatization or pillared social and cultural structures. Sweden is no less corporatized because it lacks both dimensions;22 Belgium no more so because it suffers from both.23 These are interesting and salient dimensions of societies, in and by themselves, but they do not seem to bear any close association with the phenomenon upon which I recommend we focus our attention with the concept of corporatism.
In the present state of nominalistic anarchy prevailing in the discipline, it is absurd to pretend that scholars will somehow "rally" to a particular conceptualization, spurn alternative uses of the term, and, henceforth, agree to disagree on the basis of a common lexical definition. About all one can expect from an introductory discussion such as this may be to gain a few recruits for a more specific and bounded use of the concept of corporatism, and to warn the reader that a great deal of what has recently been written about corporatism and of what will subsequently be discussed in this essay may be of no mutual relevance at all.
II
Having rejected a series of alternative usages of the concept of corporatism and expressed a preference for a more empirically bounded specification which focuses on a set of relatively directly observable, institutionally distinctive traits involving the actual practice of interest representation, it is now incumbent upon me to produce such a conceptual specification: One purpose in developing this elaborate general model, beyond that of describing the behavior of a certain number of political systems which have interested me, is to offer to the political analyst an explicit alternative to the paradigm of interest politics which has heretofore completely dominated the discipline of the North American political science: pluralism. While a considerable number and wide variety of scholars have discovered that pluralism (and with it, the closely associated liberal democratic regime-type) may be of little utility in describing the likely structure and behavior of interest-group systems in contemporary developing polities, and while some have even gone so far as to suggest that it may no longer be of much utility when applied to the practices of advanced industrial polities, few if any of these scholars have proposed an alternative or contrasting model of modem representative association-state relations. Most of them merely mourn the passing or degeneration of pluralism and either advocate its return,27 its replacement with some more formalistic, authoritative (if not authoritarian) "jurid- Practitioners of corporatism and of pluralism would heartily agree with James Madison that "among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control (my emphasis) the violence of faction." They would also agree that "giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions and the same interests . . . is as impracticable as [suppressing them altogether -PCS] would be unwise." Where the two practitioners would begin to diverge is with Madison's further assertion that "it is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these cashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good." Corporatists, basing their faith either on the superior wisdom of an authoritarian leader or the enlightened foresight of technocratic planners, believe that such a public unity can be found and kept. Their "scheme of representation," to use Madison's felicitous phrase, instead of extending the "number of citizens" and the "sphere of interests" would compress them into a fixed set of verticalized categories each representing the interdependent functions of an organic whole. Madison's metaphor was more mechanistic, and more dynamic. Hence, he was less sanguine about limiting and ordering the sources of faction-whether from above by imposition or from below by elimination. Corporatists of whatever stripe express confidence that an "enlightened statesman" (or an "enlightened state") can co-opt, control or coordinate not only those "most frivolous and fanciful distinctions [which] have been sufficient to kindle unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts," but also that "most common and durable source of faction ... the various and unequal distribution of property."30
In short, both pluralists and corporatists recognize, accept and attempt to cope with the growing structural differentiation and interest diversity of the modem polity, but they offer opposing political remedies and divergent images of the institutional form that such a modem system of interest representation will take. The former suggest spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension and competitive interaction; the latter advocate controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification and complementary interdependence. Pluralists place their faith in the shifting balance of mechanically intersecting forces; corporatists appeal to the functional adjustment of an organically interdependent whole.
While time and space limitations prevent me from developing the idea further, I suspect that these two contrasting but not diametrically opposed syndromes do not by any means exhaust the possible alternative system-types of modem interest representation.
For example, the Soviet experience suggests the existence of a "monist" model which could be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a fixed number of singular, ideologically selective, noncompetitive, functionally differentiated and hierarchically ordered categories, created, subsidized and licensed by a single party and granted a representational role within that party and vis-a-vis the state in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders, articulation of demands and mobilization of support.
Much more difficult to specify in terms of the component dimensions we have been using for the other three because of its radical and utopian nature is the syndicalist alternative. Barely sketched in by a number of theorists (several of whom subsequently became corporatists), this projected model seems to reject or to seek to transform substantially many of the given characteristics of the modern political process-more or less accepted or even encouraged by the other three syndromes. Nevertheless, a brief description of its characteristics will be offered below, partly because it has emerged with increasing frequency (if not specificity) in recent discussions of participation and representation,31 and partly because it seems to round out in logical terms the combinatorial possibilities of the variables used to define the other three types. With this last definition-model we have moved some distance from our stated limited concern with specifying the characteristics of corporatism as a distinctive and self-sustaining system of interest representation, and not confusing it with a whole system of political domination. Nevertheless, this excursion has served to remind us that the process of capturing, organizing and articulating the demands of civil society as well as those of receiving, interpreting and even applying the "imperative coordinations" of the state is only part of the political process, and hence only intelligible in purpose and consequence when considered in relation to other political subsystems and whole regime configurations. This wider set of concerns, ironically, leads us to a consideration of possible subtypes of corporatism. 31 See especially the article by Gar Alperovitz and works cited therein (fn. 18), even though the author associates his proposals with the tradition of pluralism, rather than that of syndicalism. Also Jaroslav Vanek, The Participatory Economy (Ithaca, 1971).
III
To illustrate that the skeletonal connotation of corporatism offered above accurately describes the system of interest representation of a large number of countries, including many whose global political systems differ markedly, would not be difficult-even at the existing lamentable state of our empirical knowledge. Hence, it has been argued and rather convincingly shown that Sweden,32 Switzerland,33 the Netherlands,34 Norway,35 Denmark,36 Austria,37 Spain,38 Portugal,39 Brazil,40 Chile,41 Peru,42 Greece,43 Mexico44 and Yugoslavia45 have, by and large, singular, noncom-petitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmentalized, interest associations exercising representational monopolies and accepting (de jure or de facto) govermentally imposed or negotiated limitations on the type of leaders they elect and on the scope and intensity of demands they routinely make upon the state.46 As a result, such associations have attained "a quasi-legal status and a prescriptive right to speak for their segments of the population. They influence the process of government directly, bypassing the [parliament]. They are agents of authority. They deputize for the state in whole sectors of public life, and they have duties delegated to them that properly belong to the civil service."47 The summary above applies specifically to Sweden, but it is broadly descriptive of the countries cited above-and undoubtedly of many others yet to be investigated. Such a demonstration of broad structural identity does have the virtue of debunking, if not divesting, some of these polities of the pluralist labels they have acquired-a prestigious title usually bestowed upon them for no better reason than the mere existence of a multitude of organized interests. It may also serve to call into question the relevance of many supposed properties associated with pluralism and assumed, therefore, to apply to these polities: competitiveness within sectors and, hence, accountability to members; cross-pressures and overlap and, hence, vacillation and moderation in demands; open competitiveness between interest sectors and, hence, incremental, split-the-difference solutions; penetration and subordination of political parties and, hence, broad aggregative party goals, low party discipline and absence of strong partisan ideologies; absence of stable hierarchies of organizational influence and, hence, irrelevance of class or ruling elite as political categories; low barriers of entry into the policy process and, hence, key roles assigned to "potential groups" and absence of systematic bias or exclusion; major importance attached to lobbying and, hence, concentration of attention upon parliament; assumption that policy initiatives are produced by group activity "from below" and, hence, passive roles assumed on the part of state executive and administrative bureaucracies; wide dispersion of political resources and, hence, neither omnipotent veto groups nor powerless marginal elements; and, finally, sheer multiplicity of interest and free associability ensuring spontaneous emergence of countervailing forces and, hence, a general tendency toward homeostasis or shifting equilibria.48 Corporatist systems may manage to acquire and sustain similar outcomes of demand moderation, negotiated solutions, leader accountability, "deideologization," inclusive participation, countervalence of power and homeostatic balance, but they do not do so through the processes which theorists and analysts of pluralism have emphasized. The reason for this latent (or in some cases already manifest) sense of dissatisfaction lies, no doubt, in the stretch of the conceptual distinction I have made between corporatism and pluralism. While this may be an indispensable preliminary step in classifying interest systems, especially given the ubiquity and prestige of the pluralist label, it is still one which, to use Sartori's expression, "does not travel well," or better, "travels too far too easily." If our research objective is not to make universalizing suprahistorical comparisons, but to explore middle-range hypotheses which are explicitly qualified as to cultural, historical and even geographical space, then we must proceed further, per genus et differentiam, in our taxonomic trip. We must, in short, develop the notion of possible subtypes of corporatist interest politics (just as, of course, we should with pluralist ones, although that will not be attempted here) .50
That most original and stimulating of corporatist theorists, Mihail Manoilesco, provided the key distinction between two different subtypes. The one he called corporatisme pur, in which the legitimacy and functioning of the state were primarily or exclusively dependent on the activity of singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered representative "corporations." The second in contrast he called corporatisme subordonne, in which similarly structured "corporations" were created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state which founded its legitimacy and effective func- tioning on other bases.51 This radical distinction is one which, as we shall see, involves not only the nature of power and influence relations but also the developmental pattern by which corporatism emerges, has been reiterated, expanded upon and discussed at great length by Portuguese corporatist theorists where the two subtypes were labelled corporativismo de associafao and corporativismo de Estado.52 For our purposes we could label the former, autonomous and penetrative, as societal corporatism; and the second, dependent and penetrated, as state corporatism.
Some clues to the structural and behavioral elements which differentiate these two subtypes of corporatism can be found in our initial global connotation, or more specifically in what was deliberately not included in that definition.
(1) Limited number: does not indicate whether established by processes of interassociational arrangement, by "political cartels" designed by existing participants to exclude newcomers, or by deliberate government restriction.
(2) Singular: does not indicate whether the outcome of spontaneous co-optation or competitive elimination is by surviving associations, or by state-imposed eradication of multiple or parallel associations.
(3) Compulsory: does not specify whether de facto through social pressure, contractual dues checkoff, provision of essential services and/or acquisition of private licensing capacity, or de jure through labor code or other officially decreed, exclusively conceded authority. (6) Functionally differentiated: does not specify whether arrived at through voluntaristic agreements on respective "turfs" and nonraiding provisions, or by state-established enquadramento (framing) of occupational-vocational categories.
(7) Recognition by state: does not differentiate between recognition granted as a matter of political necessity imposed from below upon public officials and that granted from above by the state as a condition for association formation and continuous operation.
(8) Representational monopoly: similar to above, does not distinguish between that which is independently conquered and that which is dependently conceded.
(9) Controls on leadership selection and interest articulation: does not suggest whether this is the product of a reciprocal consensus on procedure and/or goals, or of an asymmetric imposition by the "organized monopolists of legitimate violence."
Through this exercise in intention-the further elaboration of properties which combine to form a global concept-we have constructed two quite distinctive subtypes. The first, involving all or most of the initial elements in the either/or dichotomies made above, corresponds ideally to what we have called societal corporatism. Empirically, it is best exemplified by the cases of Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, as well as by emergent properties which have been observed by scholars in such other, supposedly pluralist, systems as Great Britain, Western Germany, France, Canada, and the United States. The second type, described by the latter elements in each either/or distinction, coalesces into a subtype we have labelled state corporatist and this conforms historically to the cases of Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Greece-as well of course to the defunct experiences of Fascist Italy, Petainist France, National Socialist Germany53 and Austria under Dollfuss.
When viewed statically, descriptively, institutionally, these two subtypes exhibit a basic structural similarity, one which sets them apart from pluralist, monist or syndicalist systems of interest representation. When viewed in motion, however, they are revealed as 
IV
Corporatism appears under two very different guises: the revolutionary and the evolutionary. It is either the product of a "new order" following from a fundamental overthrow of the political and economic institutions of a given country and created by force or special "collective spirit"; or the outcome of a natural evolution in economic and social ideas and events. In the latter case, corporatism then emerges as an aspect of a certain idie-force progressing along with the amplification and specification of the process of associational development, generating what one calls today in several democratic countries, "the corporative mystique."54
The Swiss author of these lines, himself rather caught up in "the corporative mystique" which swept his country in the 1930's, illustrates not only that theorists who contemplated the matter comparatively were well aware of the distinction between the two subtypes we have defined above, but were also quite conscious of the need for two essentially separate theories for explaining the emergence of modem corporatism. One of these would be more likely to emphasize long-term trends and slow, incremental change, cultural and institutional continuity, gradual intellectual awareness and passive political acceptance; the other more likely would be forged out of immediate conjoncture and impending collapse, strong leadership and repressive action, architectonic vision and inflated rhetoric. In a nutshell, the origins of societal corporatism lie in the slow, almost imperceptible decay of advanced pluralism; the origins of state corporatism lie in the rapid, highly visible demise of nascent pluralism.
The task of constructing this set of dual theories is enormous given the apparently bewildering variety of contexts in which one type or the other of corporatism has emerged, and the frustrating absence of empirical studies on the historical dynamics of whatever type of interest group system. Complicating the task even further is the natural tendency to confuse this problem with the more general and clearly interrelated one of the causes of the erosion/collapse of liberal democracy and the advent/consolidation of authoritarian rule.55 Even if we focus specifically and exclusively on those factors which hypothetically affect changes in the system of interest representation, we must admit from the start that the best we can do is to identify some probabilistically necessary but clearly insufficient conditions. We can only try post factum to strip historical cases of their idiosyncrasies of personality and culture, of their accidents of good and bad fortune, of their immediate but superficial catalysts and precipitants in order to reveal the underlying elements of structural conduciveness which led (and may lead in the future) to such similar and yet different outcomes as societal and state corporatism.56 I hardly need to emphasize the preliminary and speculative nature of the following dual theories.
Nor should I have to stress that they may not contribute much to explaining specific occurrences or nonoccurrences. Whatever reservations one may have about the degree of determination exercised by the structure and mode of production upon such political variables as individual attitudes, voting choice, party systems and ideological doctrines, inquiry into the origins of corporatism of either type leads one very quickly to the constraints, opportunities and contradictions placed upon political actors by the operation of the economic system. More specifically for the cases which have interested me, it leads to a consideration of the basic institutions of capitalism and the class structure of property and power engendered by it.57 Perhaps it is the directness of the linkage between the system of interest representation and these institutions of concentration of production and inequality of distribution, but the resultant situation is particularly "naked."
As a macrohypothesis, I suggest that the corporatization of interest representation is related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources. Differences in the specific nature of these imperatives or needs at different stages in the institutional development and international context of capitalism, especially as they affect the pattern of conflicting class interests, account for the difference in origins between the societal and state forms of corporatism.
Summarizing, again in a nutshell, the decay of pluralism and its gradual displacement by societal corporatism can be traced primarily to the imperative necessity for a stable, bourgeois-dominant regime, due to processes of concentration of ownership, competition 57 Incompetence prevents me from even speculating about the tendencies toward corporatization which appears to exist among societies with a quite different system of economic exploitation, namely, bureaucratic-centralized socialism. For an initial treatment of these issues, see the excellent article by Janos (fn. 45) and the works discussed therein. between national economies, expansion of the role of public policy and rationalization of decision-making within the state to associate or incorporate subordinate classes and status groups more closely within the political process.
As for the abrupt demise of incipient pluralism and its dramatic and forceful replacement by state corporatism, this seems closely associated with the necessity to enforce "social peace," not by coopting and incorporating, but by repressing and excluding the autonomous articulation of subordinate class demands in a situation where the bourgeoisie is too weak, internally divided, externally dependent and/or short of resources to respond effectively and legitimately to these demands within the framework of the liberal democratic state.
Of course, to these general elements, one must add several other "overdeterminative" factors which combine with the former, making corporatism an increasingly likely outcome: (1) secular trends toward bureaucratization and oligarchy within interest associations; (2) prior rates of political mobilization and participation; (3) diffusion of foreign ideologies and institutional practices; (4) impact of international war and/or depression. Nevertheless, the core of my speculation about structural conduciveness rests on the problems generated by delayed, dependent capitalist development and nonhegemonic class relations in the case of state corporatism, and advanced, monopoly or concentrated capitalist development and collaborative class relations in the case of societal corporatism.
Turning to an explication of the advanced capitalism-societal corporatism relation, I shall be brief, partly because of my lesser familiarity with this side, partly because there exists a series of evocatively presented and excellently documented studies of the subject.
The first major theorist to perceive certain emergent imperatives of capitalism and to link them explicitly with corporatism was John Maynard (Lord) Keynes. In a startling essay published in 1926 entitled "The End of Laissez-Faire," Keynes first debunks the orthodox claims of liberalism:
It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive "natural liberty" in their economic activities. There is no "compact" conferring perpetual rights on those who Have or those who Acquire. The world is not so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Economics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too weak to attain even these. Experience does not show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted than when they act separately.58 Given these negative results (and sous-entendu a growing awareness of them among wider and wider publics exercising the liberal voluntaristic rights accorded them by the open franchise and free associability), the agenda and nonagenda (as Keynes called it) of the state must be modified. Or, as he put it more bluntly in another essay, "In the future, the Government will have to take on many duties which it has avoided in the past."59 The objective of this imperative policy expansion is to exercise "directive intelligence through some appropriate organ of action over the many intricacies of private business, yet ... leave private initiative and enterprise unhindered." More specifically, he noted the need for (1) "deliberate control of the currency and of credit by a central institution," (2) "dissemination on a great scale of data relating to the business situations," (3) "coordinated act(s) of intelligent judgement... as to the scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should save, the scale on which these savings should go abroad . . . and whether the present organization of the investment market distributes savings along the most nationally productive channels" and, finally, (4) I believe that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control and organization lies somewhere between the individual and the modern state. I suggest, therefore, that progress lies in the growth and recognition of semi-autonomous bodies within the state-bodies whose criterion of action within their own field is solely the public good as they understand it, and from whose deliberations motives of private advantage are excluded, though some place it may still be necessary to leave, until the ambit of men's altruism grows wider, to the separate advantage of particular groups, classes, or faculties-bodies which in their ordinary course of affairs are mainly autonomous within their prescribed limitations, but are subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of democracy expressed through parliament. I propose a return, it may be said, towards medieval conceptions of separate autonomies.62
While there is no evidence (that I know of) that Keynes's slim pamphlet exerted a direct, blueprint-like, influence or even provoked a general intellectual awareness of the issues he raised, in or outside of Great Britain,63 the subsequent course of policy development in most developed Western nations confirmed his prognosis. The fundamental paradox involved has been excellently put by a Dutch scholar:
The more the private citizens succeed in organizing themselves into powerful combines and associations for the promoting of their manifold and often conflicting interests, the more they undermine the conditions that are essential to the actual functioning of the classical Liberalist concept of an automatically achieved equilibrium of freely competing societal forces. And the more this spontaneous harmonization proves to have little relation to reality, the more the government is impelled to interfere in order to secure a deliberately regulated and planned integration of interests.64 61 Ibid., p. 319. 62 Ibid., pp. 313-14 (my emphasis). 68 The much later discussion of these issues in the United States was, as might be expected, even more privatistic and antistatist than that of Keynes. For a critical evaluation of this literature, see Hal Draper "Neo-corporatists and neo-reformers," New Politics (Fall, 1961) , pp. 87-106.
To this I would simply add another: the more the modem state comes to serve as the indispensable and authoritative guarantor of capitalism by expanding its regulative and integrative tasks, the more it finds that it needs the professional expertise, specialized information, prior aggregation of opinion, contractual capability and deferred participatory legitimacy which only singular, hierarchically ordered, consensually led representative monopolies can provide. To obtain these, the state will agree to devolve upon or share with these associations much of its newly acquired decisional authority, subject, as Keynes noted, "in the last resort to the sovereignty of democracy expressed through Parliament."
This osmotic process whereby the modern state and modem interest associations seek each other out leads, on the one hand, to even further extensions of public guarantees and equilibrations and, on the other, to even further concentration and hierarchic control within these private governments. The modalities are varied and range from direct government subsidies for associations, to official recognition of bona fide interlocuteurs, to devolved responsibilities for such public tasks as unemployment or accident insurance, to permanent membership in specialized advisory councils, to positions of control in joint public-private corporations, to informal, quasicabinet status, and finally to direct participation in authoritative decision-making through national economic and social councils. The sequence by which societal corporatism has crept into the polity probably varies considerably case by case,65 but to the extent that the Dutch pattern is representative, it shows a peculiar circular trend. There it began with local and sectoral level, jointly managed social insurance schemes ( The resultant pattern evolved pragmatically and unevenly, not by the unfolding of some concerted, grand corporatist design. It moved up and down from enterprise to local to national level; back and forth from a concern with specific goods and services (insurance, health, apprenticeship), with specialized vertical production areas (metallurgy, electronics, chemicals, retail commerce) and with broad horizontal sectors (industry, commerce, agriculture); and sideways from one issue area to another (wages, prices, investment, indicative planning). While the Netherlands' osmotic adaptation may be unique in many respects, I suspect that a sequential plotting of measures of creeping corporatism in other advanced capitalist societies would not be very different.67
Thanks to the effort of Andrew Shonfield, it hardly seems necessary to pursue these speculations much further. In his magisterial, Modern Capitalism, he has demonstrated in great detail how, in order to correct inherent defects linked to processes of internal concentration and external competition, the moder "positive" state finds itself simultaneously attempting to foster full employment, promote economic growth, prevent inflation, smooth out business cycles, regulate working conditions, cover individual economic and social risks and resolve labor conflicts. This drastic modification of the governmental agenda/nonagenda has in turn led to (and is in part the product of) a major change in the relationship between interest associations and the public bureaucracy, as advocated and predicted by Lord Keynes. Shonfield unhesitatingly labels this formula as corporatist: "The major interest groups are brought together and encouraged to conclude a series of bargains about their 66 The work from which this primitive sequential account is drawn Theorists-apologists for state corporatism are usually not very helpful. This, not so much because they tended to be less perceptive and personally objective than, say, Lord Keynes, but because they were caught in a built-in contradiction between their subjective speculative task and the objective political function they were indirectly called upon to perform. So, for example, there is scarcely a single state-corporatist theorist who does not proclaim his opposition to statism, his com-78 Shonfield concentrates almost exclusively on the post-World War II period. Only in the case of the United States does he systematically probe further back. Is it just a coincidence that those European countries which were neutral in World War I moved more rapidly and thoroughly towards corporization (except Austria), than the belligerents? Also worth exploring in greater detail are the diverse policy responses to the Great Depression-as our rapid sketch of the Netherlands illustrated.
For the concept of "dominant paradigm of public choice" and its effect in reducing alternative courses of action, see Charles W. Anderson, "Public Policy, Pluralism and the Further Evolution of Advanced Industrial Society" (Paper prepared for delivery at the APSA Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 1973). mitment to decisional decentralization and his desire for eventual associational autonomy.79 Nevertheless, our theorist is aware that given the fragmented, ideologically charged and class-divided nature of the political system he is operating within, singular, nonconflictive, hierarchically ordered and functionally compartmentalized associations are not likely to be spontaneously forthcoming. He therefore advocates the temporary use of state authority to establish these compulsory structures-and to remove voluntaristic, competing ones-all, of course, in the name of national and/or public interest. Other than some vaguely specified reference to the eventual emergence of a "corporatist consciousness" (his equivalent to the New Soviet Man), our theorist conveniently forgets to specify the political mechanism by which the state's authoritarian presence can be made to "fade out," leaving those imagined self-governing agents of decentralized decision-making behind. Perhaps the most obvious case of this praxiological hypocrisy has been Portugal, if only because Oliveira Salazar so repeatedly and (apparently) sincerely expressed his fervent opposition to statism or even to any form of governmental economic intervention, while presiding over the creation of one of the most overbureaucratized, minutely regulated, centralized state apparatuses ever observed.
If such theorists can hardly be trusted with regard to the state, then neither can one expect them to be entirely candid about corporatism's relation to capitalism and specific class interests. One of their favorite themes-admittedly one which is today somewhat less loudly proclaimed-is that corporatism from above constitutes some sort of tertium genus between and distinct from either capitalism or socialism-communism. Hence, while they are often capable of decrying, in lurid and quite convincing terms, the inequitable and rachitic performance of existing capitalist institutions (and of conjuring up terrible visions of life under godless socialism), they are obviously not very concerned with revealing how the forceful implantation of corporatism acts as an instrument for rescuing and consolidating capitalism rather than replacing it. Given the unan- imous emphasis they place on functional interdependence and group harmony, we should hardly expect them to delve too deeply into the elements of class conflict, status antagonism and centerperiphery tension that such an imposed system of interest representation is designed to suppress, if not overcome.
In short, as we attempt to put together speculatively some hypotheses as to the contexts in which this state corporatist response emerges and the possible range of variation and sequences of implantation it may encompass, we are not likely to get much help from its manifest theorists-apologists, as we did in the case of societal corporatism.
There is, fortunately, one interesting exception: Mihal3 tions would provide the answer to overcoming modem man's moral and spiritual malaise, integrating him into society through new communal bonds, the imperative forces leading to corporatization were to be found in the political economy of his time, in the nature of ownership, production and distribution of capitalism itself. In fact, at several reprises, Manoilesco approvingly cites Marx, although in general he regards him as a theorist of the past rather than the present century.
Third, Manoilesco denies that corporatism is merely a temporary defense mechanism for the mobilization and/or protection of class egoism which will somehow fade away when the conjunctural threat has passed. Rather, he presents it as a permanent institutional form, not intrinsically beholden to any social class or even to the maintenance of the status quo, capable of subduing particular interests to overriding national goals and eventually of transforming the capitalist basis of society itself.
In contemporary parlance, Manoilesco was a theorist of "external dependence." While he occasionally hints at essentially internal political conditions, for example, "premature" radicalization of the working class through ideological diffusion, fragmentation and loss of nerve on the part of the bourgeoisie, urban-rural tensions, decline of local and regional loyalties, that might contribute to provoking a corporatist response, its essential "reason for becoming" lies in the system of unequal international exchange.
Just as Marx's theory leads us to understand the social phenomena of the capitalist world and especially that of exploitation by classes, this theory of international exchange makes us understand the inequality between peoples and relations of exploiter and exploited that connect them.82
Corporatism, as he understood and advocated it, is an institutionalpolitical response to a particular process of transformation that the world political economy and its attendant system of international stratification is presently undergoing. Its "dominant cause" lies in the relations between peoples, rather than between classes within national units. In fact the latter are conditioned, if not determined, by the former. The entire spectrum of political forces has shifted: "The Nineteenth Century knew the economic solidarity of class. The Twentieth will know the economic solidarity of nations."83 According to Manoilesco, the dynamic element in this process of world economic transformation consists of a radical "national" demand for restructuring the international division of labor and its distribution of benefits. Peripheral capitalist nations are becoming increasingly aware of the disparity in returns generated by their exchange of raw materials and foodstuffs for the manufactured goods produced by the advanced, earlier developing economies and are beginning to implement new national economic policies, especially ones aiming at import-substituting industrialization and control of foreign trade. This diffusion of industrialization and policy techniques was greatly accelerated by World War I, but is an autonomous secular trend which can be expected to continue on throughout the century. In essence and embryo, Manoilesco anticipated the general arguments and even many of the specific points of what twenty years later came to be known as the ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations) doctrine or, even later, the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) position.
To this, he added a second, more static observation: the end of territorial expansion. The twentieth century, he felt, would see the exhaustion of both open internal frontiers and manifest external imperialism. While he by no means could be credited with foreseeing the formal decolonialization of Africa and Asia (his perspective was strictly Eurocentric), he did see that the international system had in a physical sense filled out existing space. Borders and loyalties were becoming fixed; territoriality from being a variable had become a constant. Economic, social and political problems would have to be tackled and especially organized within constant, zero-sum parameters.
These compound changes in interational relations-the collapse of the prewar liberal economic order, the rising demand for equality of benefit and status between nation-states, the definitive demarcation of territoriality -provided the materialistic (and speculative) foundations for Manoilesco's ideology of defensive, nationalistic modernization from above. Each national unit, each state, must henceforth act exclusively as its own agent in its own interests and with its own resources, bargaining continually for survival and self-advantage in a dangerous and unstably equili-83 Ibid., p. 35. brated international system. Nineteenth-century assumptions about liberty and initiative in the pursuit of individual self-interest and the benevolent, self-corrective operation of free and competitive markets and political processes were no longer valid. As a consequence of these new tensions between central and peripheral capitalisms and between all autarkically minded nation-states, the twentieth century would impose new conceptions of justice and forms of political organization.
Corporatism, he argued, would be one of, if not the institutional response to these impe6ratifs de P'poque. It alone would permit the state to fulfil the new functions which were being thrust upon public policy by external exigences. It would emerge first where those imperatives and tensions were the strongest, the southeastern and southern periphery of Europe, but once successful there, it would compel similar transformations in the organizational structure and policy practices of the earlier developing, liberal-pluralist systems.
But why corporatism? Why this particular set of sous-instru ments de 'Etat as Manoilesco unflinchingly called them? His arguments are multiple, if not equally convincing and consistent: 1) Such corporations would fill out a continuous hierarchy of authority, thereby providing the isolated and impotent individual with a set of well-defined intermediary ranks and loyalties "dragging him into society" a la Durkheim and offering the political system the means "to resolve from a unitary and logical point of view all the specialized problems posed by the complex relations between the individual and the state."84 To do this, Manoilesco noted, these new units of representation would have to be integral, not just cover economic interests as in Fascist Italy, but spiritual and moral ones as well.
2) The functional specialization of corporations would be "technologically self-determining" dividing the polity into vertical units of interest aggregation which in turn would enhance the role of technical expertise, depersonalize leadership and bring out naturally balanced interdependencies between issue areas. Most importantly and specifically, they would facilitate the expanding role of the state in national economic planning and international economic bargaining.
3) By devolving authority from the state to "neatly defined," 84 Ibid., p. 74. "never contradictory" and "preestablished" interest hierarchies, the state would be relieved of decisional and implementational responsibility over "nonessential" matters (welfare, health, etc.) and could then devote more attention and effort to such "essential" tasks as internal security, external defense, foreign affairs, and national propaganda. In addition, Despite the fact that corporative consciousness is presently weak, it will always triumph in the end. Because in the limited world we are entering today, where solidarity and organization are imperatives for survival, there will be no place for artificial social differences. Or, differences of class are mostly artificial and temporary, linked to the exceptional circumstances of the nineteenth century.86 While Manoilesco implies that this "benevolent" ninety-degree switch in the polarities of group consciousness would begin in the periphery and come as the result of, rather than the prerequisite for, the forceful implantation of state corporatism, he hints that it will 85 Ibid., p. 131. This is the same author who thirty pages before had claimed: "Between the corporatist conception of the state and the pure individualistic one, there is a certain coincidence in outcomes. Both systems result (aboutissent) in a minimal state"!! (p. 101). 86 Ibid., p. 107-8. be subsequently transmitted to the center where its adoption will be more spontaneous and voluntary:
In Western Europe, the owning class and the working class will draw together, impelled by the common danger they both face equally of witnessing the collapse of the industrial superiority from which they have both benefited.87
Tactically speaking, Manoilesco observes that in the short run "the best way to vanquish the actual antagonism of classes is to recognize it," that is, to incorporate "separate but equal" (paritaire) representations of owners and workers within the same corporation, but in the long run it will no longer be necessary to provide even such a simulated equilibrium, given the projected disappearance of class identification.88 5) One reason Manoilesco was able to soft-pedal the coercive, authoritarian aspects of the transition to state corporatism was his belief that the twentieth century would see a major change in "the scales of moral and social values" held by citizens and subjects. The past century's ideals of individual equality and liberty would be replaced by new collective goals of social justice, based on differential rights and obligations according to the functional importance of one's role in society; and the goal of organization would replace consensual restrictions on mutual activity in return for security and higher productivity. Both of these new idoles de Fepoque would, of course, have to be made compatible with and subordinate to the highest ideal of all, that "indisputable criterion," which Manoilesco exclaimed in a burst of totalitarian rhetoric to mean that: "All that conforms to the national interest is just; all that is contrary to that interest is unjust."89 As complex and suggestive (if schematic and deformed by wishful thinking) as these hypotheses may be, Manoilesco is much less explicit about the politics and the specific decisional sequence involved in the transition toward this new form of interest representation. Pure (read, societal) corporatism, he conceded three years later, can only be attained after the widespread development of "corporative consciousness" and such a high degree of national 87 Ibid., p. 108, fn. 1. 88 Ibid., pp. 108-9. 89 Ibid., p. 110.
integration that "old" and "artificial" class and partisan loyalties had been eradicated or, at least, severely eroded. This, he admits, is a long way off and, in the meantime, those "imperatives of the epoch" demand action, especially in the periphery. There, subordinate corporatism is the only answer: "It is natural that the corporations must be held in tutelage. The indicated tutor ... is the single party . . . for a transitory period."90
In the present absence of comparative case studies, it is not easy to evaluate the merits of Manoilesco's prototheory of the emergence of state corporatism, or to elaborate further upon it. In a very general way, there seems to be a correspondence between the context of peripheral, delayed-dependent capitalism; awareness of relative underdevelopment; resentment against inferior international status; desire for enhanced national economic and political autarky; extension of state control through regulatory policies, sectoral planning and public enterprise; emergence of a more professionalized and achievement-oriented situs of civil servants; and the forced corporatization of interest representation from above. Manoilesco's belated remarks on the specific instrumentality responsible for this change have been less well confirmed. In no case was the single ruling party the primary or exclusive tutelary agent. Rather, state executive and administrative bodies tended to act directly in both establishing and subsequently controlling these new sous-instruments. The implantation of state corporatism, in fact, was compatible with a wide range of party contexts-from the no-party systems of Brazil, Greece and Austria, to the weak, reigning but not ruling, single-party systems of Spain and Portugal, to the strong monopolistic party systems of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.
On the surface, state corporatism was implanted much more dramatically, quickly, thoroughly and rationally than was the case with the hestitant, uneven, experimental, incremental, "creeping" pattern of its societal cousin. "Born at the stroke of the legislative baton," as one French critic put it,91 overnight immense organizational hierarchies with sonorous names were created, covering all interest sectors and all levels of the polity with impressive symmetry of representative and equality of access. Subsequently, these monu- However, detailed analyses92 have not only revealed the fictitious physical existence of many of these sonorous organizations and their marginal influence over public policy, but have also unmasked their pretence of class symmetry and equality of access. Moving ruthlessly to suppress all preexisting worker associations and to fill the resulting organizational vacuum as quickly as possible with the maximum number and most widely dispersed set of new compliant worker sindilcatos, the state corporatists acted much more cautiously and "understandingly" with respect to producer and owner interests. Preexisting, voluntaristically supported associations were tolerated or incorporated with their leadership and functions intact; strategically placed elites were granted special organizational privileges and exemptions, for example, the right to form specialized national associations independent of the general sectoral hierarchies; rural landowners, except for those cultivating certain export crops, were left largely untouched, and associations for rural workers, where allowed to exist, were placed under their local control; no serious attempt was made to transform such preexistent, premodern corporations as the Church and the universities; corporatization of civil servants was expressly prohibited, as well as other forms of associability for this situs; finally, either no attempt was made to create "uniclass" peak associations of employers and workers (Brazil) or, where the attempt was belatedly made (Portugal), the resultant corporaFoes have been run by and for employers. In short, what appear at first sight to be architectonic monuments of great scope, foresight and symmetry turn out upon closer inspection to be just about as limited, improvised and lopsided as those of their societally corporatist relatives.
Some of Manoilesco's prototheoretical assumptions about the political functions and policy consequences of state corporatism seem to have been confirmed by its subsequent praxis. It has been associated with the extension of state control over export commodities, sectoral policies of import substitution and attempts to exert greater influence in international economic negotiations. While by no means successful in eradicating horizontal (class) forms of consciousness, its imposition of verticalized decisional hierarchies and fragmented interest categories has definitely undermined the cohesion and capacity to act of the proletariat and even of the bourgeoisie with respect to general policy issues. It has advanced pari passu with an expansion in the role of technocratic expertise and impersonal (if not to say faceless) leadership styles. Most importantly, it has greatly advanced and facilitated verselbstdndigte Macht der Executiugewalt, that "process whereby state executive power becomes progressively more independent" from accountability to organized social groups, that Marx so long ago suggested was the crucial element in modern authoritarian rule.93
Otherwise, Manoilesco's specific functional hypotheses have not stood up so well. Horizontal consciousness shows no sign of disappearing no matter how suppressed. Class inequalities in access and benefit have not been erased; they have been institutionalized and augmented. The decision-making load on the state has not been lightened but burdened by the proliferation of dependent functional hierarchies; far from being freed to pursue bold and innovative national policies, the corporate state has been trapped in a fantastically complex network of fiscal prebends, sectoral exemptions and entrenched privileges which ties it closely to a stalemated status quo. Popular demands for individual freedom and equality have yet to give way to respect for organizational hierarchy and acceptance of differential justice. Most striking, however, is the total lack of confirmation in praxis of Manoilesco's assertion of pious hope that corporatism from above would result in a secular decline in the rate of profit, a devaluation of the role of entrepreneurial risk-taking, a diminution of the power of private property and the emergence of a new social or collective mode of production So far, state corporatism has produced the contrary and one rather suspects it was always intended to do so. If we accept Manoilesco's belief in centennial longevity and my hunch that it all began during and immediately after World War I, then we are presently right smack in the middle of the century of corporatism and hence condemned to live with it for another fifty or so years. Kurt Vonnegut's poetic imagination offers us the "comforting" thought that full corporatization will only come in the aftermath of a third major world war. Nevertheless, barring his vision of a future global conflagration precipitating further change, and adopting a more surprise-free scenario, we may question whether corporatism, state or societal, will manage to fill out its century.
State corporatism is everywhere revealing itself more and more costly to maintain through repressive measures and less and less capable of providing the accurate information, semivoluntaristic compliance and contractual complicity needed for managing the modern capitalist state. The obvious answer, an institutional shift from the imposed, exclusionist to the invited, inclusionist type of corporatism, has yet to be made peacefully and incrementally. But the transition to societal corporatism seems to depend very much on a liberal-pluralist past, involving the following: a history of autonomous organizational development; authenticity of representation; protracted encounters between classes and sectors which acquired distinct self-images and loyalties and, eventually, a measure of mutual respect; the presence of competitive party and parliamentary arenas to which wider appeals could be addressed; and, perhaps most importantly, on a previous pattern of relative noninterference by the state which only gradually came to expand its role-and then usually at the request of organized private interests. Countries locked into state corporatism at an earlier stage of development are likely to find it much more difficult to evolve toward such a consensual solution. There the established pattern is one of asymmetric dependence, unauthentic and fragmented representation, weak associational loyalties, suppressed or manipulated conflict, little mutual respect among groups, no effective means of appealing to wider publics and pervasive state bureaucratic control.94 Under these conditions, it is difficult to imagine a politically continuous transformation toward societal corporatism; rather, one suspects that the state-corporatist system must first degenerate into openly conflictful, multifaceted, uncontrolled interest politics-pluralism in other words-as appears to be happening in contemporary Spain. Established, societally corporatist systems are also facing new tensions which they, too, seem incapable of resolving.95 They are being bombarded with demands for more direct and authentic forms of participation, undermining both the stability of their established internal hierarchies of authority and their claims to democratic legitimacy. More importantly, they are being bypassed with increasing frequency by broad social movements on the one side and specific spontaneous protest actions on the other. The very values and assumptions about society upon which corporatism ultimately rests, functional specialization and hierarchical organization, security and prevision, "productivism" and efficiency, economic growth and mass consumption as ends in themselves, are being called into question by these movements and actions. Here, the prospective associational answer is certainly not further societal corporatization, nor a reversion to past pluralism, nor even less a regression to state corporatism, but may be some experimentation with the sort of dispersed, nonspecialized, nonhierarchic, "hivedoff," voluntaristic units, autonomously responsible for allocating their values and resolving their conflicts, an interest system which we earlier tentatively identified as syndicalist. Again, however, the 
